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Abstract Models of consciousness differ in whether they
predict a gradual change or a discontinuous transition
between nonconscious and conscious perception. Sergent
and Dehaene (Psychological Science, 15, 720–728, 2004)
asked subjects to rate on a continuous scale the subjective
visibility of target words presented during an attentional
blink. They found that these words were either detected as
well as targets outside the attentional-blink period or not
detected at all, and interpreted these results as support
for a discontinuous transition between nonconscious and
conscious processing. We present results from 4 attentional-
blink experiments showing that this all-or-none rating
pattern disappears with the use of an alternative measure
of consciousness (post-decision wagering) and a more
difficult identification task. Instead, under these circum-
stances, subjects used the consciousness rating scales in a
continuous fashion. These results are more consistent with
models that assume a gradual change between non-
conscious and conscious perception during the attentional
blink.
Keywords Attentional blink.Consciousness.Post-
decision wagering.Awareness.Subjective ratings
Introduction
An important question in research on consciousness is
whether there is a continuous or discontinuous transition
between nonconscious and conscious perception. In support of
the former, imaging studies of visual perception have found
gradual increases in the strength of cortical activity as
subjective perception of a stimulus improved (e.g., Moutoussis
&Z e k i ,2002). According to this view, conscious perception
is achieved when the strength of a perceptual representation
crosses a threshold toward the higher end of a continuum of
(un)conscious states. Other studies have reported all-or-none
differences in neural activation between nonconscious and
conscious perception of a stimulus (Dehaene et al., 2001;
Lamme, Supèr, Landman, Roelfsema, & Spekreijse, 2000),
suggesting a discontinuous transition between the two states.
Such qualitative differences between nonconscious and
conscious processing are often predicted by models that
consider recurrent interactions between distant brain areas a
prerequisite for conscious perception (Dehaene, Sergent, &
Changeux, 2003;L a m m e ,2003). For example, the global
neuronal workspace model (Dehaene et al., 2003)a s s u m e s
that bottom-up neural activity may be sufficiently strong to
trigger self-amplifying recurrent activity, resulting in conscious
perception. Progressively decreasing the strength of this
bottom-up activity initially leads to a gradual decrease in
global activation and thus in subjective visibility. At a certain
threshold, however, there is a discontinuous jump to a lower
level of activation, corresponding to a lack of sustained
activation and therefore an absence of conscious perception.
Sergent and Dehaene (2004) have tested contrasting
predictions of discontinuous- and continuous-transition
models by examining subjective visibility ratings of
participants in an attentional-blink experiment (reviewed
in Martens & Wyble, 2010). In each trial, participants were
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DOI 10.3758/s13414-010-0026-1presented with two targets embedded in a rapid serial visual
presentation (RSVP) stream of consonant strings. Parti-
cipants had to identify the first target (T1: OXXO or
XOOX) and rate the subjective visibility of the second
target (T2: the French number word ‘DEUX, ‘CINQ’,
‘SEPT’ or ‘HUIT’), which was present in only half the
trials. Subjective visibility ratings were made on a 21-point
horizontal scale labeled ‘not seen’ on the left end and
‘maximal visibility’ on the right end. The number of items
(lag) between T1 and T2 was systematically varied between
1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 8. As expected, mean T2 visibility ratings
in T2-present trials were high when T2 was presented
outside the attentional-blink period (i.e., at lags 6 and 8),
and strongly reduced when T2 was presented during the
attentional-blink period (at lags 2–4).
The critical predictions concerned the distributions of T2
visibility ratings in T2-present trials. Sergent and Dehaene
(2004) argued that a model postulating a continuum of
perception would predict that the attentional blink is
characterized by a gradual degradation of the T2 word
representations. This should result in a gradual displace-
ment of subjective ratings toward lower subjective degrees
of visibility. In contrast, discontinuous-transition models
like the global neuronal workspace model would predict
that subjective visibility ratings show a bimodal distribu-
tion, and that the attentional blink is characterized by an
increase of one peak (indicating that T2 was not seen) at the
expense of the second peak (indicating that T2 was seen).
The subjective visibility ratings reported by Sergent and
Dehaene showed a striking pattern consistent with a discon-
tinuous transition between nonconscious and conscious
perception of T2. Participants used the visibility scale in an
all-or-none fashion: targets were either identified as well as
targets presented outside the attentional-blink period or not
detected at all. Changes across lags in the strength of the
attentional blink were characterized by changing proportions
of ‘seen’ and ‘not seen’ ratings at both ends of the subjective
visibility scale. Sergent and Dehaene interpreted these
findings as support for a sharp nonlinear transition between
nonconscious and conscious perception.
In this study, we addressed three potential limitations of
Sergent and Dehaene’s( 2004) experiment. The first
potential limitation concerns t h en a t u r eo ft h es u b j e c t i v e
visibility scale used. As previously noted by others
(Overgaard, Rote, Mouridsen, & Ramsøy, 2006), it is
unlikely that people are able to recognize or report such
fine gradations of subjective visibility as to justify the use
of a 21-point scale. Furthermore, the fact that only the end
positions on the scale were labeled may have made it more
difficult for participants to use intermediate (unlabeled)
positions. Therefore, the visibility ratings in Sergent and
Dehaene’s experiment may have been all-or-none because
only the two extreme ends of the scale were labeled
and the intermediate points on the scale did not have
sufficient meaning to the participants. In Experiment 1,
we addressed this possibility by examining whether we
could replicate Sergent and Dehaene’s findings using a
7-point scale.
The second potential limitation concerns the use of
subjective visibility ratings as a measure of consciousness. It
has been noted that subjective reports such as those used in
Sergent and Dehaene (2004) may not have sufficient ‘null
sensitivity’. That is, participants tend to withhold minimal
conscious knowledge of weakly perceived stimuli (cf.
Overgaard et al., 2006). Persaud, McLeod, and Cowey
(2007) have recently proposed that this limitation is resolved
by an alternative method called post-decision wagering.
Participants are required to first make a psychophysical
decision and then place a bet on its correctness by making a
higher or lower wager. If the decision is correct, the
participant wins the amount of money wagered; if it is
incorrect, the participant loses that amount. Participants thus
have the opportunity to gain money on the basis of their
psychophysical performance. Researchers have argued that
post-decision wagering is a more implicit way to assess
awareness, and a more intuitive measure for participants than
introspection (Koch & Preuschoff, 2007; Persaud et al.,
2007; but for a critique see Clifford, Arabzadeh, & Harris,
2007). In Experiment 2, we examined whether Sergent and
Dehaene’s findings would generalize to an experiment that
replicated their attentional-blink task but used post-decision
wagering instead of subjective visibility ratings.
A third peculiar aspect of the study by Sergent and
Dehaene (2004) is that the T2 stimuli, of which participants
had to rate the subjective visibility, were words. Even if
word recognition is initially disrupted by a pattern mask
(e.g., the T2 + 1 distractor), our cognitive system is often
able to use perception of single letters to complete the
representation of the word, based on interactive activation
between representations at the letter level and word level
(McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981). This mechanism may
considerably ameliorate the attentional blink. In Experi-
ments 3 and 4, the distractors and targets in the RSVP
stream were single characters, as is typical in attentional-
blink research, and participants had to identify T2 (which
was present in half the trials) as well as rate its subjective
visibility. For what it is worth, informal reports (in exit
interviews) from participants in previous studies using this
stimulus material suggest graded levels of consciousness of
the targets—an experience that is apparently inconsistent
with the all-or-none perception reported by Sergent and
Dehaene. In Experiment 3, we combined the character-
identification task with subjective visibility ratings, and in
Experiment 4 with post-decision wagering.
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Experiment 1 was a replication of Sergent and Dehaene’s
(2004) first experiment, with two notable exceptions. We
did not include a single-task condition. More importantly,
we used a 7-point instead of 21-point scale for indicating
subjective visibility of T2.
Method
Participants Twelve students of Leiden University partic-
ipated in a session of approximately 45 min in return for
€6.50.
Stimuli, procedure, and design Stimuli were presented in
blue (cyan) on a black background, except for T1 which
was presented in white. Each trial started with a fixation
cross, presented for 1,000 ms at the center of the computer
screen. Then, the fixation cross was replaced by an RSVP
stream of 10 to 20 letter strings, each measuring 4° × 1°.
All items were displayed for 43 ms, separated by 71-ms
blanks. T1 could either be “OXXO” or “XOOX”, while T2
was a Dutch four-letter number word, “DRIE”, “VIER”,
“VIJF”,o r“ACHT”, similar to the French number words
used by Sergent and Dehaene (2004). All other items were
distractors, consisting of four random consonants. T1 was
presented at positions 7 or 10 in the stream. The temporal
distance between T1 and T2 was systematically varied
between 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 8 items, corresponding to lags of
114, 228, 342, 456, 684, and 912 ms. After T2, two more
distractors were displayed.
Immediately after the RSVP stream, participants were
asked to rate the subjective visibility of T2 (“… indicate
how well you have seen the second target …”) on a 7-point
horizontal scale, labeled “not seen” at the left and “maximal
visibility” at the right end. Participants moved a cursor on
the scale by pressing the left and right arrow keys on a
keyboard, and then validated their choice by pressing the
space bar. To prevent response bias, the initial cursor
position was randomly determined for each trial. Subse-
quently, participants were asked to identify the two middle
letters of T1 (either “OO” or “XX”) by pressing the O or X
key.
In half the trials, T2 was replaced with a blank screen.
Also, to prevent T2-absent trials from being too obvious,
20% of all distractors were replaced with a blank
screen, except for distractors immediately preceding
or following T1 or T2, and the last distractor in the
RSVP stream. Totals of 32 trials for each lag were run
for both the T2-present and T2-absent conditions,
resulting in a total of 192 T2-present trials and 192 T2-
absent trials.
Results and discussion
One participant who rated “not seen” in all trials was
discarded from further analyses. Trials with an incorrect
response to T1 (M = 14.6%) were discarded. A Greenhouse-
Geisser correction was applied where appropriate. An
analysis of variance showed a significant effect of lag on
mean visibility ratings in T2-present trials, F(5, 50) =
7.0, p = .009. Mean visibility ratings dropped from 77%
at lag 1 to 65% at lag 2, then increased to 83% at lag 6,
indicating a typical attentional blink (Fig. 1). In T2-absent
trials, mean visibility ratings were very low and unaffected
by lag.
Figure 2 shows the rating distributions in T2-absent and
T2-present trials as a function of lag. In the T2-absent trials,
the distributions showed a single peak at 0% visibility
(>80% of the trials). In contrast, in T2-present trials in
which T2 was clearly visible (outside the attentional blink,
at lags 6 and 8), the distribution showed a prominent peak
at 100% visibility (~55% of the trials). Importantly, the
visibility ratings for T2-present trials during the
attentional-blink period showed a clearly bimodal pattern:
in some trials, participants gave high visibility ratings,
similar to those obtained outside the attentional-blink
period, while in the other trials they used the lowest
visibility rating (~15% of the responses at 0% visibility),
indicating an attentional blink. Some of the intermediate
ratings were rarely chosen (especially 17 and 33%).
However, the 67 and 83% ratings were chosen more
often, suggesting that perception of T2 was not all-or-none
as in Sergent and Dehaene (2004). Indeed, the pattern of
visibility ratings was more similar to that obtained in a
replication study (including EEG) by Sergent, Baillet, and
Dehaene (2005), who abandoned the term “all-or-none”
and instead referred to a “discontinuous transition”
between nonconscious and conscious perception.
Following Sergent and Dehaene (2004), we tested the
hypothesis that ratings during the attentional blink reflect a
mixture of discrete seen and not-seen states by submitting
the grand-average rating distributions for the T2-present
trials (lags 1–6) to a linear regression, using two predictors:
the rating distribution observed when T2 was present at lag
8 (present predictor), and the distribution observed when
T2 was absent at lag 8 (absent predictor). The present
predictor explained a significant portion of the variance
for all lags (ps < .002). The contribution of the absent
predictor was significant for lag 3 (p = .037), marginally
significant for lag 2 (p = .077), and not significant for the
other lags. The contribution of the absent predictor for
lags 2 and 3 suggests that during the attentional blink
some of the T2-present trials were subjectively indistin-
guishable from T2-absent trials.
366 Atten Percept Psychophys (2011) 73:364–373To further compare our results with those of Sergent and
Dehaene (2004, Experiment 1), we re-grouped their 21-bin
data into 7 bins by grouping together the observations from
each 3 original bins. The resulting visibility distributions
are shown in Fig. 3, alongside our T2-present distributions.
Although we cannot infer that Sergent and Dehaene’s data
would have looked like this had they used 7 instead of 21
bins, the similarity between the distributions from the two
experiments is striking.
Thus, despite the use of a 7-point rating scale, we
replicated the bimodal rating pattern reported by Sergent
and Dehaene (2004) and, to some extent, the all-or-none
character of that pattern, although “discontinuous transi-
tion” is perhaps a safer description. We emphasize that 7
is still a rather arbitrary choice of scale points. Other
authors have advocated the use of a 4-point scale (the
Perceptual Awareness Scale; Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004)
and have supported the strength of this scale with
empirical data (e.g., Sandberg, Timmermans, Overgaard,
& Cleeremans, in press).
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we replicated the previous experiment, but
using post-decision wagering as an alternative measure of
awareness.
Method
All methods were identical to Experiment 1, except when
noted below. Thirteen participants were paid €6.50 plus a
performance-related bonus, as described below. Each RSVP
sequence was followed by the presentation of a scale almost
identical to the visibility scale used in Experiment 1.
However, instead of judging T2 visibility, participants were
asked to wager an amount of money on the presence or
absence of T2 (“… indicate how much money you are
prepared to wager on the presence or absence of the second
target.”). To optimize the comparison with the visibility
scale in Experiment 1, we used a post-decision wagering
scale that collapsed the decisions about presence/absence
and wagered amount into a single decision. This contrasts
with previous research in which participants were asked to
make these decisions sequentially (e.g., Persaud et al.,
2007). The scale consisted of seven positions: €0.60, €0.40,
and €0.20 wagers on the absence of T2, a €0 wager, and
€0.20, €0.40, and €0.60 wagers on the presence of T2. The
scale was labeled “absent” at the left end and “present” at
the right end. When participants rated T2 correctly as
absent or present (i.e., when they wagered an amount on the
correct side of the horizontal wagering scale), they received
the amount of money wagered. When they wagered an
amount on the wrong side of the wagering scale, they lost
the amount wagered. Participants were informed that a
randomly determined 10% of all post-decision wagers
would be paid after the experiment.
Results and discussion
Trials with an incorrect T1 identification were discarded
(M = 13.0%). For T2-present trials, mean wager scores
dropped from €0.49 (lag 1) to €0.41 (lag 2), then increased
to €0.49 at lag 6 (Fig. 1). Although this trend follows the
typical attentional-blink pattern, the effect of lag was
nonsignificant, F(5, 60) = 2.7, p = .10, indicating that
participants did not show a reliable attentional blink.
The wager distributions, plotted in Fig. 2,s h o wa
striking pattern. In the T2-absent trials, participants gener-
ally wagered ‘T2 absent’, although the wager scores were
more distributed than the visibility ratings in Experiment 1.
Interestingly, the distributions for T2-present trials showed
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Atten Percept Psychophys (2011) 73:364–373 367a single, large peak at the maximum T2-present wager
(>63% of the trials), and hardly any T2-absent wagers
(<9% wagers to the left of €0), even during the attentional
blink—a unimodal pattern very different from the bimodal
pattern reported in Sergent and Dehaene (2004)a n d
Experiment 1. This was confirmed by a linear regression
analysis of the grand-average wager distributions for T2-
present trials (lags 1–6), which indicated significant con-
tributions of the present predictor (ps < .001) but not of the
absent predictor.
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368 Atten Percept Psychophys (2011) 73:364–373What does this wager pattern mean? One possible
explanation is that the monetary reward associated with
good performance increased the participants’ effort or
motivation and that this led to an increased perceptual
sensitivity (i.e., d’ in signal-detection theory). Participants
tried harder to detect T2 and therefore succeeded more
often. However, earlier research has shown that offering
performance-related monetary rewards does not improve
attentional-blink performance (Olivers & Nieuwenhuis,
2005). Therefore, the results can probably be better
understood as resulting from a change in response criterion
(β in signal-detection theory). That is, even in T2-present
trials that participants would classify as low or even zero
subjective visibility (i.e., below the 50%-visibility criteri-
on), participants generally have minimal conscious access
to T2—but sufficient to justify a wager on T2 presence (i.e.,
above the €0 criterion)
1. This possibility is consistent with
previous claims that post-decision wagering might avoid
participants’ reluctance to report weakly perceived stimuli
(which biases introspective reports). Also, in Experiment 3,
we will report some evidence consistent with the notion that
participants fail to be complete in their reports about what
they consciously saw.
But why is the rating pattern so extreme? That is, why did
participants go for the highest wager on such a large
proportion of the T2-present trials? One possibility is that
participants realized that the economically optimal strategy
for wagering in experiments like the current experiment is to
wager high regardless of the weight of the sensory evidence
(Clifford et al., 2007). Or participants may not have been
aware of the optimal strategy, and instead wagered high
because of a risk-seeking bias, a personality trait that can
affect post-decision wagering (Fleming & Dolan, 2010;
Schurger & Sher, 2008). Although we cannot exclude these
possibilities, we believe they are unlikely, first, because the
‘T2 absent’ ratings in T2-absent trials were much more
spread across the (left end of the) scale (i.e., which is
economically suboptimal), second, because previous post-
decision wagering studies have shown that people do not
tend to wager optimally (Schurger & Sher, 2008;S h i e l d s ,
Smith, Guttmannova, & Washburn, 2005), and third,
because other participants from the same population used
the whole post-decision wagering scale in Experiment 4.
In any case, these data are important for two reasons. At
the methodological level, the experiment (in comparison
with Experiment 1) indicates a striking dissociation
between two different measures of consciousness, which
may contribute to the ongoing debate about the relative
usefulness of these measures. With regard to consciousness
during the attentional blink, the experiment suggests that
Sergent and Dehaene’s( 2004) findings of bimodal percep-
tion ratings (largely replicated in Experiment 1) may be
specific to a particular consciousness measure (subjective
visibility) and, at least in this particular context, do not
generalize to another consciousness measure (wagering).
However, because the wager ratings in Experiment 2
showed no reliable attentional blink, the data do not
directly address the question whether consciousness during
the attentional blink is a gradual or all-or-none dimension.
Experiment 3
In Experiment 3, we combined subjective visibility ratings
with a character-identification task that is more representative
of attentional-blink research and that is more difficult than
the word-detection task used by Sergent and Dehaene (2004).
1 Because participants cannot have minimal conscious access to T2 in
T2-absent trials, the hypothesized criterion shift need not necessarily
lead to ‘T2 present’ wagers on T2-absent trials (in Experiment 2) that
would have been rated as 0% visibility in Experiment 1. This might
explain why, in T2-present trials, more trials move from the left end
(in Experiment 1) to the right end of the scale (in Experiment 2) than
in T2-absent trials.
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All methods were identical to Experiment 1, except when
noted below. Fourteen participants were asked to identify
both T1 and T2 in an RSVP sequence. In this experiment,
T1 (again colored cyan) and T2 were digits between 2 and
9. Distractors consisted of single random letters, except I,
O, Q, and S. The visual angle of the RSVP items was 1° ×
1°. Again, T2 was absent in half of the trials, and 20% of all
distractors were replaced by a blank screen. After the RSVP
sequence, participants were asked to rate the visibility of T2
on the visibility scale, and then identify T1 and T2 by
pressing the corresponding numeral keys on the keyboard.
Participants were instructed to press a random numeral key
to indicate a fully unperceived (and possibly absent) T2.
Like in Experiment 1, the visibility ratings occurred
immediately after the RSVP stream (and before the
identification of T1 and T2) to rule out the possibility that
participants would forget information on T2 visibility
(Sergent & Dehaene, 2004).
Results and discussion
Trials in which T1 and T2 were correctly identified but in the
wrong order were treated as correct. Trials in which T1 was
not correctly identified were discarded (M = 15.1%). Mean
visibility ratings (Fig. 1), F(5, 65) = 21.7, p < .001, and T2
identification accuracy (Fig. 4), F(5, 65) = 9.0, p <. 0 0 1 ,i n
T2-present trials showed significant effects of lag, indicating
a typical attentional blink.
Figure 2 shows that the distributions of visibility ratings
in T2-absent trials were similar to those in Experiment 1,
with a single peak at 0% visibility (>60% of the trials).
Crucially, the distributions for T2-present trials showed a
very different pattern than in Experiment 1: instead of
bimodal distributions, the visibility ratings showed rather
uniform distributions. Furthermore, the attentional blink
was characterized by a gradual displacement of subjective
ratings toward lower subjective degrees of visibility, as
evidenced by a significant lag × visibility interaction,
F(30, 390) = 5.8, p < .001, a pattern consistent with the
notion of a gradual transition between nonconscious and
conscious perception.
As in the previous experiments, we conducted a linear
regression analysis of the grand-average rating distribu-
tions for T2-present trials (lags 1–6). The present
predictor (except at lag 6, p = .001) and the absent
predictor did not significantly contribute to these regres-
sions, suggesting that contrary to what was found in
Sergent and Dehaene (2004) ,a n dt oas m a l l e re x t e n ti n
Experiment 1, participants did not use the subjective
visibility scale in an all-or-none fashion. We conducted
similar linear regression analyses of the rating distribu-
tions of individual participants, focusing specifically at lag
2, where the attentional blink was most pronounced. These
analyses confirmed the analysis of the grand-average
rating distributions: there was only 1 out of 14 participants
for which both the present and absent predictor signifi-
cantly contributed to the regression. Visual inspection
confirmed that this was the only participant with distinct
peaks at 0 and 100% visibility.
Proponents of the post-decision wagering measure have
suggested that participants are sometimes reluctant to
report weakly perceived stimuli in introspective reports
like subjective visibility ratings. To address this possibil-
ity, we examined whether T2 identification performance
was above chance level (12.5%) in trials during the
attentional blink (lags 2 and 3) in which participants
claimed to have not seen T2 (0% visibility) and guessed
its identity. Because some participants had few 0%-
visibility trials, we pooled the 129 trials of all 14
participants. Consistent with the notion of incomplete
report, T2 identification performance for these trials was
24.8%. However, it is important to note that these data are
equally consistent with the possibility that the above-
chance task performance reflects nonconscious knowledge
(by the guessing criterion; Dienes, 2008).
Experiment 4
In Experiment 4, we combined the more difficult identifi-
cation task used in Experiment 3 with the post-decision
wagering method used in Experiment 2. Twelve students
took part in the experiment.
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Trials in which T1 and T2 were correctly identified but in
the wrong order were treated as correct. Trials with an
incorrect T1 identification were discarded (M = 11.1%).
Mean wager scores (Fig. 1), F(5, 55) = 19.0, p < .001, and
T2 identification accuracy (Fig. 4), F(5, 55) = 11.3, p =
.001, in T2-present trials showed significant effects of lag,
indicating a typical attentional blink.
The wager distributions, plotted in Fig. 2,s h o wa
slightly complicated pattern. Almost all T2-absent trials
were identified correctly (~85% wagers on ‘T2 absent’); the
wagers were spread across the left side of the scale, with a
small peak at €0.60 and a pronounced peak at €0.20,
suggesting that participants were often uncertain of their
decision. The wagers on T2-present trials showed a
somewhat similar spread across the right side of the scale,
with distinct peaks at €0.20 and €0.60. Importantly, during
the attentional-blink period the wagers gradually shifted
towards lower values, as evidenced by a significant lag ×
visibility interaction, F(30, 330) = 12.2, p < .001, such that
at lag 2 the wagers were fairly well spread across the whole
scale. There is a hint of a discontinuity between €0.60 and
€0.20 (‘T2 absent’), but nonlinear bifurcation models
predictsuch a discontinuity immediately below the perceptual
threshold (i.e., to the left of €0), not halfway the T2-absent
scale (see Sergent & Dehaene, 2004, Fig. 1). A linear
regression analysis of the grand-average wager distributions
for T2-present trials (lags 1–6) indicated a significant
contribution of the present predictor for lags 4 (p =. 0 1 )
and 6 (p < .001), but no contribution (and even negative beta
coefficients) for the absent predictor. This was corroborated
by regression analyses of the individual wager distributions
for lag 2, which revealed only one participant (with distinct
peaks at €20 for T2 ‘absent’ and ‘present’) with significant
contributions of both the absent and present predictors. Thus,
the wager distributions in Experiment 4 largely converge
with the subjective visibility distributions in Experiment 3 in
suggesting that during the attentional blink perceptual target
representations are progressively degraded.
Although Fig. 2 shows marked differences between the
distributions in Experiments 3 and 4, they are not as
striking as the differences between Experiments 1 and 2 and
do not suggest a substantial criterion shift; that is, there is a
fairly good correspondence between the percentages of 0%-
visibility trials in Experiment 3 and the percentages of ‘T2
absent’ wagers in Experiment 4.
General discussion
The attentional blink is an attractive paradigm for con-
sciousness research because stimuli that are physically
identical are sometimes consciously perceived and some-
times not. Sergent and Dehaene (2004) exploited this
property to examine whether the transition between
nonconscious and conscious perception is gradual or
discontinuous. The participants in their experiment, when
asked to rate the subjective visibility of targets on a 21-
point scale, showed an extreme rating pattern: during the
attentional blink T2s were either detected as well as targets
outside the attentional-blink period or not detected at all.
In the 4 experiments reported here, we found mixed
evidence for such all-or-none perception. In Experiment
1, we adopted Sergent and Dehaene’s( 2004,E x p e r i m e n t
1) methods, but using a 7-point instead of 21-point rating
scale. The subjective visibility ratings obtained in this
experiment were bimodally distributed, but the ‘T2 seen’
modus was not peaked but rather spread out, much like in
S e r g e n te ta l .( 2005). This may, in part, reflect the high-
pass filter function of a coarser scale, because when we re-
grouped Sergent and Dehaene’s 21-bin data into 7 bins,
the distribution of ratings across these bins looked
remarkably similar to our data in Experiment 1. However,
the data are also consistent with the hypothesis (cf.
Overgaard et al., 2006) that the disproportional use of
the extreme ratings (0 and 100% visibility) in Sergent and
Dehaene’s( 2004)ex perimentisinpartdu etothefa ctthatthe
intermediate points on their 21-point scale did not have
sufficient meaning to the participants. Nonetheless, the
regression analyses of our (more spread-out) 7-point scale
ratings replicated Sergent and Dehaene’s( 2004) finding that
the visibility ratings in attentional-blink trials can be
described as a bimodal mixture of seen (all) and not-seen
(none) perceptual states.
Whereas in Experiment 1 we used Sergent and Dehaene’s
(2004) word-detection task, in Experiments 3 and 4 we used
a more difficult and commonly used character-identification
task. The visibility ratings in Experiment 3 were broadly (not
bimodally) distributed, and the attentional blink was charac-
terized by a gradual displacement toward lower subjective
visibility ratings, consistent with continuous-transition mod-
els. It is possible that subjects have graded access to stimulus
information at some levels of representation (e.g., the
characters in Experiment 3) while having all-or-none access
to other levels of stimulus representation (e.g., word form
and meaning in Experiment 1). Even if subjects initially have
graded conscious access to word form and meaning (e.g.,
because the T2 + 1 distractor masks the target word), the
process of interactive activation between representations
at the letter level and the word level may lead to the
automatic filling-in of missing information, resulting in a
complete (i.e., “all”) representation of the word (McClelland
& Rumelhart, 1981). Indeed, this interactive activation
mechanism bears resemblance to the type of global
reverberation that causes complete conscious access in
Atten Percept Psychophys (2011) 73:364–373 371workspace models of consciousness (e.g., Dehaene et al.,
2003). Thus, it is possible that the type of all-or-none rating
pattern obtained with Sergent and Dehaene’sw o r d - d e t e c t i o n
task is specific for words and other stimuli promoting
interactive activation.
In Experiment 4, we combined the character-identification
task with post-decision wagering and found a similar gradual
displacement in wager scores. To the extent that post-
decision wagering measures access consciousness (i.e., the
degree to which information is accessible for verbal report,
reasoning or action), these results provide additional
support for continuous-transition models of (non)conscious
perception. Intuitively, it seems that wagers are made
highly deliberately and that post-decision wagering can be
treated as a test of awareness of knowing. However, it is
not trivial that access consciousness can be inferred from
successful wagering, because subjects may be able to learn
to gamble implicitly on the basis of nonconscious
information. For example, gambling behavior may be
driven by nonconscious, graded and probabilistic repre-
sentations of evidence or value, even when people’s
conscious states reflect only discrete samples from these
probability distributions (Vul, Hanus, & Kanwisher, 2009).
Furthermore, although it seems reasonable to assume that
increased gradations of consciousness go hand in hand
with higher wagers, wagering is susceptible to psycholog-
ical factors irrelevant to access consciousness, such as risk
aversion (Fleming & Dolan, 2010; Schurger & Sher,
2008), that are hard to control. Thus, although the results
of Experiment 4 are consistent with discontinuous models,
the strength of this evidence depends on the status of post-
decision wagering as an effective method for measuring
access consciousness. This is a topic of ongoing debate
and research (e.g., Dienes & Seth, 2010; Overgaard,
Timmermans, Sandberg, Cleeremans, 2010;P e r s a u d&
McLeod, 2008;S e t h ,2008). For example, Sandberg et al.
(in press) found in a visual masking experiment that post-
decision wagering was a less sensitive and exhaustive
measure of consciousness than the Perceptual Awareness
Scale, a subjective visibility scale. The salient difference
between post-decision wagering and introspective meas-
ures like subjective visibility is exemplified by the results
of Experiment 2 in which the discontinuous rating pattern
obtained in Experiment 1 disappeared altogether; indeed,
the wager scores did not show an attentional blink (i.e., all
T2s were ‘seen’).
Is it possible that subjects’ perception during the
attentional blink is always all-or-none and that our methods
in Experiments 3 and 4 failed to capture this property?
Individual subjects may show all-or-none (or bimodal)
rating patterns that are invisible in the grand-average rating
distributions due to “smearing” across subjects. However,
this is ruled out by the results of the regression analyses for
individual participants in Experiments 3 and 4, which
showed that there were only two participants whose rating
distributions during the attentional blink could be modeled
as a mixture of ‘seen’ and ‘not seen’ states. It is harder to
exclude the possibility that the perception of any given
participant in Experiments 3 and 4 is characterized by a
discontinuous threshold that changes position and therefore
smears out across trials, causing a seemingly continuous
rating distribution. But if this is the case, one would expect
a similar variability in threshold in the word-detection task
of Experiment 1 and Sergent and Dehaene (2004)—a
possibility that seems inconsistent with the clearly bimodal
rating distributions in these experiments.
Alternatively, is it possible that there is always a
continuous transition between nonconscious and conscious
perception during the attentional blink, and that Sergent and
Dehaene’s( 2004) particular combination of methods failed
to capture this continuous transition? This possibility is
challenged by Experiments 2 and 3 of Sergent and
Dehaene, which showed that participants—with the same
instructions as in Experiment 1—used the subjective
visibility scale in a continuous fashion when judging the
visibility of masked words of variable durations (see also
Sandberg et al., in press). Then again, it is possible that the
discrepancy between Sergent and Dehaene’s findings in the
attentional-blink task and masking task reflects a response
bias: participants, at least under Sergent and Dehaene’s
experimental conditions, may tend to use the subjective
visibility ratings in an all-or-none fashion when they know
objective visibility of T2 is all-or-none (attentional blink),
and in a more graded fashion when they know objective
visibility of the target changes from trial to trial (masking).
Future research that compares consciousness ratings across
different types of paradigms should take into account this
type of response bias.
Taken together, our results cast doubt on Sergent and
Dehaene’s( 2004) proposal that perception during the
attentional blink has an all-or-none character. Evidence for
a discontinuous transition between nonconscious and
conscious perception can be obtained under specific
conditions (e.g., when detecting words). However, our
results show that under different conditions (e.g., character
discrimination, a task more commonly used in attentional-
blink research), evidence obtained with two different
consciousness measures favors a continuous transition
between nonconscious and conscious perception during
the attentional blink.
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